Monday, February 02, 2009

What shapes literature

Time’s book critic Lev Grossman is convinced that, as the magazine’s headline announces, the digital age is reshaping literature (h/t: Daniel Green). “Literature interprets the world,” Grossman says, “but it’s also shaped by that world, and we’re living through one of the greatest economic and technological transformations since—well, since the early 18th century.”

The eighteenth century is significant, because according to Grossman (repeating a scholarly commonplace as if he were saying something original), the “novel in its modern form really got rolling” then:

This wasn’t an accident, and it didn’t happen because a bunch of writers like Defoe and Richardson and Fielding suddenly decided we should be reading long books about imaginary people. It happened as a result of an unprecedented configuration of financial and technological circumstances. New industrial printing techniques meant you could print lots of books cheaply; a modern capitalist marketplace had evolved in which you could sell them; and for the first time there was a large, increasingly literate, relatively well-off urban middle class to buy and read them. Once those conditions were in place, writers like Defoe and Richardson showed up to take advantage of them.[1]But while this third-hand Marxism may seem to explain the rise of mass-market fiction, it does nothing whatever to distinguish Moll Flanders or Pamela from the Morte d’Arthur or the Arcadia. Why did the “large, increasingly literate, relatively well-off urban middle class” not prefer the supernatural to realistic replica-worlds?

The older theory is that the novel came of age along with the individual, and thus the novel, understood as fiction in which human character is represented and developed, owes its emergence to a political concept. This older theory has not so much been disproven as discarded. We are all cultural materialists now, at least those of us who live by received ideas.

In the American university, cultural materialism has spawned a new discipline—the history of the book. (Bibliography, the old discipline, was materialist only in its exclusive concern with how books are made and where to find them.) And what would an academic fashion be without a French auteur? Roger Chartier, a historian of the Annales school who teaches at the Collège de France, stitched together the new discipline by combining reception theory with the study of printed objects. Its purpose, he explains, is to replace the “lazy familiarity with which literary history is transformed into a pantheon of great texts” with “another project altogether,” which aims at “reinserting works, whatever they might be, into the conditions and procedures that governed their writing, their distribution and their reception. . . .”[2]

As someone who believes that literature is shaped by material forces outside individual control, including how it is used, especially by what he calls “the political and economic powers,” Chartier is unruffled by the thought that electronic texts may replace printed books. To see into the literary future, “we must,” he says, “do two things”:First, we need to examine the changes that have begun, at an uneven rate, in the world today and place them where they belong within the revolutions in techniques for reproductions of texts, in the forms of the book, and in manners of reading. Then, taking into account the effects of meaning produced by the material aspects of writing, we need to reflect on the many consequences of our entry into the age of the electronic representation of texts and their reading on screens.[3]The effects of meaning produced by the material aspects of writing—there in a phrase is the assumption behind all such efforts as Lev Grossman’s to predict what will become of the novel. “Like fan fiction,” Grossman says breathlessly,it will be ravenously referential and intertextual in ways that will strain copyright law to the breaking point. Novels will get longer—electronic books aren’t bound by physical constraints—and they’ll be patchable and updatable, like software. We’ll see more novels doled out episodically, on the model of TV series or, for that matter, the serial novels of the 19th century. We can expect a literary culture of pleasure and immediate gratification. Reading on a screen speeds you up: you don’t linger on the language; you just click through. We’ll see less modernist-style difficulty and more romance-novel-style sentiment and high-speed-narrative throughput. Novels will compete to hook you in the first paragraph and then hang on for dear life.It sounds swell. I can hardly wait. But if any of this happens, it won’t be for the reason Grossman thinks. It won’t be because the material conditions of fiction-writing generate its meaning. It will be, rather, because the new technology ratifies what a writer has already been doing.

Let me illustrate. According to Chartier, the invention of the codex was fundamental and far more important than the invention of printing, because the transition from unrolling a scroll to turning a page gave the book “the form, structure, and organization it has retained up to the present.” And when discussing the history of the codex, it is ritual to point out that the new form of the book was first mentioned by Martial (14.184–92), who praised its compactness. The best of these is his epigram on a single-volume Livy:Pellibus exiguis artatur Livius ingens,
Quem mea non totum bibliotheca capit.


In this one book whole histories are told
That once whole libraries could scarcely hold.
What few historians of the book go on to observe is that by the time he got around to praising the codex, Martial had already become the universally acknowledged master of the most compact form of writing known to man. The epigram, as its name implies, originated as writing upon—engravings, inscriptions, graffiti. A codex with pages simply gave Martial something more convenient to write upon.

I am just old enough to have lived through the technological transformation of writing from manual typewriters (my father, a professor at the local junior college, picked me up a secondhand Underwood, with blank keys for typing students, when the business department purchased newer models) through impatiently humming Selectrics with changeable “typeballs” into the earliest days of word-processing on an Apple II, when preparing a typescript was much like marking up .html, and finally to the sophisticated software of today, with drag-and-drop editing, simultaneous spell-checking, automated hyphenation, and even the capacity to embed right-to-left Hebrew or Arabic into English prose. How have these transformations, these alterations in the material conditions of writing, influenced meaning?

Not at all. They have made it easier for me to complete what I set out to write. Nothing more. Ralph Marvell, who “could do charming things, if only he had known how to finish them!” would not have been saved by purchasing a typewriter, which had reached a standardized design about the same time that Wharton was writing The Custom of the Country. Ralph is destroyed by intellectual errors—by believing that a creative temperament unfitted him for business, by a bad marriage, entered into for the wrong reasons, by the conviction “how killing uncongenial work is,” and not being grateful for the support it provides his son.

When technology accompanies a cognitive revolution, then and only then does it have much chance to shape literature. The invention of printing hastened the shift from listening to silent reading, which had already been under way for a millennium, or ever since Augustine came upon Ambrose seeking out the meaning of a page with his heart. Before Gutenberg, as the historian of ideas William A. Ringler points out, “all longer fictional English narratives had been in verse.”[4] Verse is an aid to listening; the prose novel emerged when printing made books more readily available, aiding the practice of silent reading. Meaning is produced not by the material aspects of writing, but by its intellectual conditions. And the ways human beings think, evolved over eons, are not so responsive to change.
_____________________

[1] This view is elaborated by Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

[2] Roger Chartier, “The End of the Reign of the Book,” trans. Eric D. Friedman, SubStance 26 (1997): 9–11.

[3] Roger Chartier, Forms and Meanings: Texts, Performances, and Audiences from Codex to Computer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), p. 5.

[4] William A. Ringler Jr., ”Beware the Cat and the Beginnings of English Fiction,” Novel 12 (Winter 1979): 113–26.

Sunday, February 01, 2009

The Ghost Writer

In recent days I have been rebuked from all sides. On one hand I am too severe, holding a reductive and even dismissive view of the value of literature and literary study; on the other, I am too indulgent, giving in to the same basic background of general belletristic humanism covering the same set of books. For this Commonplace Blog’s landmark one hundredth post, then, I have decided to return for a deep drink at one of my purest fontes. I need to remind myself how I came to develop such objectionable beliefs about literature and criticism.

The Ghost Writer (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1979) was Philip Roth’s tenth novel. The first of his “Zuckerman books,” although an early draft of Nathan Zuckerman had been introduced eight years before in a story in Philip Rahv’s short-lived Modern Occasions, the short 180-page novel turned his career around. At the age of forty-six, Roth experienced a creative reawakening. His previous four novels, including the oddball fantasies The Breast and Our Gang, had shown a novelist with little idea what to do with his enormous literary gifts. In the character of Nathan Zuckerman, who doubled as his narrator, Roth discovered a solution to a literary problem that had bedeviled him since early in his career—namely, how to make use of those insights that only a writer would have.

The Ghost Writer is a lesson in literary paternity. The novel’s progress is deceptively simple. The time is 1956. Nathan Zuckerman, a 23-year-old postulate to the life of art, arrives for an overnight visit with Emanuel Lonoff, a story writer who resembles Malamud (bald, discovered late in life, a specialist in bachelors and other solitaries, married to a non-Jew). The action takes place entirely within the scope of Nathan’s sixteen-hour stay. The plot parallels Henry James’s late story “The Middle Years,” from which Lonoff has extracted an artistic credo (“Our doubt is our passion and our passion is our task. The rest is the madness of art”), taped on the wall of his study, and which Nathan hungrily reads and summarizes before the visit is through.

The other houseguest is Amy Bellette, a 26-year-old former student of the famous writer. She is attractive (Lonoff describes her as being “from the country of fetching”). And since she looks somewhat like Anne Frank, Nathan spins out the fantasy that she actually is Anne Frank, having miraculously escaped the Nazis’ claw; he tries to imagine the reason why Anne would be hiding her real identity. If she were Anne in actual flesh, and if she would only agree to marry him, she would solve all his problems—she would be “the unchallengeable answer” to Jewish criticism.

Nathan is at an important crossroads in his own literary career. His family complains that his fiction is irresponsible toward them and the Jewish people. They have turned to Judge Leopold Wapter, a locally prominent Newark Jew, for advice. In a letter giving his “candid opinion” of a story by Nathan, the judge writes: “I do believe that, like all men, the artist has a responsibility to his fellow man, to the society in which he lives, and to the cause of truth and justice.” He encloses a questionnaire written for Nathan by his wife, opening with the challenge, “If you had been living in Nazi Germany in the thirties, would you have written such a story?” The Wapters are exactly the sort of authority figures, the conventional and middlebrow spokesmen for a moral view of literature, whose counsel a young writer is bound to reject. The 22-year-old Nathan feels that he stands above such petty concerns:

Hadn’t Joyce, hadn’t Flaubert, hadn’t Thomas Wolfe, the romantic genius of my high-school reading list, all been condemned for disloyalty or treachery or immorality [that is, for lack of responsibility] by those who saw themselves as slandered in their works? As even the judge knew, literary history was in part the history of novelists infuriating fellow countrymen, family, and friends.Nathan, in other words, puts in a claim to special status. His biological father protests that “People don’t read art—they read about people.” But Nathan longs to practice the “religion of art.” That’s why he has sought out Lonoff, making a pilgrimage to one of the religion’s shrines. As he looks around Lonoff’s house, he thinks: “Purity. Serenity. Simplicity. Seclusion. All one’s concentration and flamboyance and originality reserved for the grueling, exalted, transcendent calling. I looked around and thought, This is how I will live.”

Lonoff himself, however, has no such romantic illusions about the religion of art:I turn sentences around. That’s my life. I write a sentence and then I turn it around. Then I look at it and I turn it around again. Then I have lunch. Then I come back in and write another sentence. Then I have tea and turn the new sentence around. Then I read the two sentences over and turn them both around. Then I lie down on my sofa and think. Then I get up and throw them out and start from the beginning. . . .If Lonoff is without illusions, his wife Hope is even less so. For thirty-five years she has lived with Lonoff’s silence and impatience and bad moods. Now she is ready to give up on the marriage.

Nathan is on hand to witness the marital crisis. Although outwardly their life is placid and enviable—isolated in the Berkshires, far from literary politics—the Lonoffs are approaching the breaking point. The proximate cause is Amy. She works for the Widener Library, and has reputedly come to convince the writer to deposit his papers and manuscripts there, but the truth is that she and Lonoff are (or were) lovers. While it is not clear whether Lonoff’s wife knows this for a fact, Amy’s presence in the house creates a tension that eventually shatters Hope. She makes a scene at the dinner table, threatening to leave Lonoff and yield her place to Amy. For Nathan, who wanted to become Lonoff’s “spiritual son,” this is more of an introduction into the family than he could have bargained for.

Yet here we come to the real issue. Is Hope disgusted with the literary life she has led with Lonoff, or is she deeply wounded—does she feel rejected—by Lonoff’s desire for Amy?

That night Nathan overhears a scene in the bedroom above him. Amy begs Lonoff to run away with her to Florence and start a new life. When he refuses, she opens her robe and asks, “Oh, Manny, would it kill you just to kiss my breasts?” Lonoff will not, however, and Nathan is amazed at his superhuman control.

Why not? Why doesn’t Lonoff take Amy and run away with her? Hope gives her blessing, after all. And he confesses to Nathan that he wishes he could. He is tired of Hope; he is in love with Amy. Why doesn’t he do what both women seem to want?

The answer is pretty simple, although it will not please those who elevate erotic passion and the religion of art, which spring from the same source, above everything else. Lonoff stays with Hope out of a sense of responsibility. Not mere conjugal duty, although it is that too (“you don’t chuck a woman out after thirty-five years because you’d prefer to see a new face over your fruit juice”). More than that, Lonoff has a sense of responsibility to life that is revealed by his whole approach to art.

Just minutes after admitting to Nathan that he dreams about running away with Amy, Lonoff gets up and shows him how to use the record player. He explains the entire mechanism in close detail. Nathan reflects:And this, I realized, is the excrutiating scrupulosity, the same maddening, meticulous attention to every last detail, that makes you great, that keeps you going and got you through and now is dragging you down. Standing with E. I. Lonoff over the disobedient arm of his record player, I understood the celebrated phenomenon for the first time: a man, his destiny, and his work—all one. What a terrible triumph!And what a young man’s remark! Nathan believes there is something sacramental about the life of art—that literature is a matter of “wizardry,” to use his word. It troubles him to find that, instead of being a wizard leading the “pure, serene, simple, and secluded” life of art, Lonoff is merely a 58-year-old man who fiddles obsessively with words and stereo equipment—a “passionate corrector,” to borrow James’s phrase.

So in chapter 3 (“Femme Fatale”) Nathan sets out Oedipally to overcome—to outperform—his literary pater. He “evolves a fiction” in which he imagines that Amy Bellette is Anne Frank, filling in her “middle years” between the Holocaust and creative-writing classes in postwar America. As his Amy/Anne tries to decide whether to come out of anonymity, she too grapples with the question of the artist’s responsibility:To keep her existence a secret from her father so as to help improve mankind . . . no, not at this late date. The improvement of the living was their business, not hers; they could improve themselves, if they should ever be so disposed; and if not, not. Her responsibility was to the dead, if to anyone—to her sister, to her mother, to all the slaughtered schoolchildren who had been her friends. There was her diary’s purpose, there was her ordained mission: to restore in print their status as flesh and blood. . . .Since she is his creature, however, the imagined Amy/Anne is captive to the same emotional conditions as Nathan. “Responsibility to the dead?” she demands. “Rhetoric for the pious! There was nothing to give the dead—they were dead. . . . ‘No atonement is required,’ said Amy to Anne.” And said Amy/Anne to Nathan, who is also searching for a way out of having to atone for hurting and angering his natural father.

Thus Amy/Anne’s conclusion is very close to Nathan’s own:[A]ll I wanted was revenge. It wasn’t for the dead—it had nothing to do with bringing back the dead or scourging the living. It wasn’t corpses I was avenging—it was the motherless, fatherless, sisterless, venge-filled, hate-filled, shame-filled, half-flayed, seething thing. It was myself. I wanted tears, I wanted their Christian tears to run like Jewish blood, for me. I wanted their pity—and in the most pitiless way.Anne Frank is, after all, “the greatest Jewish writer since Kafka”—perhaps the greatest Jewish writer of all time! And isn’t this just exactly the mantle that Nathan Zuckerman aspires to inherit? Isn’t this why, like Jacob in the tent of Isaac, he hovers around E. I. Lonoff and Felix Abravanel (modeled upon Bellow), hoping for a literary blessing? He evolves a fictional Amy/Anne so as to take revenge upon his critics and tormentors, and to earn their pity. “[F]iction,” as he puts it, is “the unchallengable answer to their questionnaire that I proposed to offer the Wapters.” Fiction: an evasion of responsibility by ducking into the sacred precincts of art.

Except, of course, as she reminds him, the girl he imagines is not Anne Frank. Her real name is Amy Bellette. Perhaps Amy Belles Lettres? That is, Amy Literature? In the language of current literary theory, Amy is “overdetermined.” Or, in plainer words, Nathan makes too much out of her. Even when he imagines the “real” Amy, she too is an aspiring writer. He narcissistically assumes, in short, that the basis of her attachment to Lonoff is the same as his—that of a postulate of art.

The truth seems to be less romantic. Amy is an attractive younger woman who has had an affair with her teacher, a famous and powerful older man. At least those are the terms in which Lonoff himself might describe things. “Stop dreaming,” he says when Amy fantasizes a life for them in Florence. “Melodrama, Amy,” he says when she uncovers herself for him. “Decide not to lose hold,” he says—“and then don’t.” Lonoff has a positive repugnance for exaggeration; his moral view, like his writing, is strict and to the point and even parsimonious. But it is also honest. Honest: and imbued with a genuine sense of responsibility.

For in the end Lonoff will not leave Hope. And he will not because he feels a sense of responsibility to her. Responsibility and affection. “Oh, Hopie,” he says tenderly when she threatens to leave. Hope will have none of it: “There is his religion of art, my young successor,” she shouts at Amy: “rejecting life! Not living is what he makes his beautiful fiction out of!” There is another sense of “rejecting life.” If Amy and Florence represent life to him—a “second chance,” to use the phrase for what Dencombe seeks in James’s “Middle Years”—then by rejecting Amy he rejects life. But he does so because he shares the wisdom that Dencombe has also come to:A second chance--that’s the delusion. There never was to be but one. We work in the dark—we do what we can—we give what we have. Our doubt is our passion and our passion is our task. The rest is the madness of art.These are the words from James’s story that Lonoff has taped on the wall of his study. And they are central to any interpretation of The Ghost Writer; they are almost Roth’s motto. What they seem to be saying is this. The artist’s responsibility (his “task”) is to the very things he doubts the most—that is, his deepest commitments; the people he loves, to whom he “gives what he has.” What Nathan wants to call “the religion of art” James (and Lonoff) prefer to call “the madness of art.” Why? Because the artist is first of all a flesh-and-blood person, and above all else a person exists in service to others. Only in as far as it serves others, doing what it can—only in its ethical dimension, in short—can his work justify itself. The rest of it—the wizardry, the revenge, the claim to special status outside the human nexus—is “madness.”

Nathan’s real father, that stern and moralistic critic, turns out to be right. People don’t read art. They read about people. And judge them as such. The lesson of Nathan’s visit with Lonoff is that the writer owes more to people than to art. Lonoff himself says as much to Nathan on the novel’s last page: “I’ll be curious to see how we all come out someday. It could be an interesting story. You’re not so nice and polite in your fiction. . . . You’re a different person.” “Am I?” Nathan asks. “I should hope so,” Lonoff concludes—hoping that, as a writer, Nathan grows up, assumes responsibility, and learns that his “task” to get his people to “come out someday”—to come out right, true to themselves. If nothing else, the almost primal literary visit with Lonoff teaches Nathan that the true interest of fiction lies, not in the sacred hush of art and its special claims, but in the intricate and tortured interrelationships between people. People who do what they can for one another—in passion and doubt.

Saturday, January 31, 2009

Bibliography and book blogging

Andrew Seal has returned to the fight. This time he dislikes my introductory list of fifty-some titles on the history and theory of the novel. It seems that I “threw” my list at poor Mark Thwaite, who’d confided that he had been “thinking more and more about the history of the novel,” and asked explicitly: “What should be on my reading list, then?”

Seal is not impressed. I just can’t draw up a list to satisfy him! At least this time around he didn’t complain that there are more Frederick Karl books (3) on it than books by men of color. This time my list is “too cumbersome to be of much use except maybe for someone preparing for orals in grad school.” I regret to inform him that an orals list would have to be several times longer—for anyone who expected to learn the impervious facts so well he could dispense with them. If a fifty-title list is too “cumbersome,” may I suggest a less physically taxing line of work? But then Seal turns on his heel and offers, as an alternative to mine, the UCLA English department’s reading list on the novel, which contains forty-six titles in criticism. I would be tempted to conclude that Seal is hopelessly muddled if it weren’t obvious that almost his entire purpose is to take shots at me, no matter how weirdly aimed.

The rest of his criticisms can safely be ignored, then. Where he does not contradict himself (my list is both “cumbersome” and “redundant,” although the duplication might seem to lighten the load), he blames me for not providing something different from what was asked. “[I]nstead of bald lists which give the reader lots of options which she must sort out,” he scolds, “an actual attempt to create something which will help a reader understand how to go about ordering a set of names or titles, how to turn a reading list into knowledge.” Thwaite asked for a reading list; I replied with a reading list. My bad.

Things get comical, though, when Seal tries to provide some “context” for studying the English novel, which had been so sorely lacking in my list. You should first, you see, strike off down a “formalist path which would track the development and diffusion of novelistic forms. . . .” But there is also another path, and you should not be sorry that you cannot travel both. You can! Read “a lot of Marxists”! On the first path you “you would be reading things like D. A. Miller and Nancy Armstrong and Franco Moretti, Bakhtin, some narratologists like Todorov and Peter Brooks.” On the second: Raymond Williams, Fredric Jameson, György Lukács, Lucien Goldmann, Cathy Davidson, Homi K. Bhabha, Edward Said, Robert Stepto, and Henry Louis Gates Jr. The latter “things,” as I guess Seal would call them, “focus on the communities that create/receive these [novelistic] forms.”

An entire context for studying the novel. In just one paragraph and fifteen names. And nearly all from the last ten minutes of the history of criticism. (Bakhtin was first translated into English in 1968.) Only two concepts you need to get straight too—form and community. True, he’s tossed a Russian together with a Hungarian, an Italian, an Indian, and a Romanian-born French theorist, but he’s got his African Americans, a counterfeit Palestinian, and at least two women. If coherence is not his long suit, or even a concern, Seal at least holds out something lightweight and frothy, whatever is the opposite of cumbersome. You have to admire how easily he can dispense with those impervious facts about the novel!

I don’t mind overmuch that Seal thinks that my reading list on the novel, “not very concerned about context or redundancy or even error or irrelevance,” is indicative of everything that is wrong with most “lit-blogs.” He doesn’t like me or my Commonplace Blog. I get it. I really do. I will lose sleep tonight, but I will recover. I do wish he understood that bibliography is indispensable to literary knowledge; that I am not alone in thinking so; and that, unlike context, a book list can, to use Derrida’s term for it, be “saturated.” When he arrogates to himself, though, the role of deciding what book blogs ought or ought not to do (“Instead of just aggregating choice, we can aggregate real knowledge,” whatever that means), I can only giggle. All such attempts to dictate from above, especially by someone with such slim qualifications for the role, are doomed to pathetic failure. I’ll keep doing what I have been doing, even if Andrew Seal keeps disliking it.

Friday, January 30, 2009

Terrorism by other means

A particularly grime-caked corner of the academic left, whose bias Marc Bousquet snickers is a “problem” that has been “manufactured,” has called for a cultural and scholarly boycott of Israel. Its spokesman, unsurprisingly, is an English professor by the name of David Lloyd. “The initiative was in the first place impelled by Israel’s latest brutal assault on Gaza,” Lloyd says, “and by our determination to say enough is enough.”

Congratulating themselves upon being “educators of conscience,” the organizers of the U.S. Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel argue that they are justified in calling for an academic boycott, because Israel is engaging in “scholasticide.” (The Double-Tongued Dictionary traces the concoction to an article earlier this month in the Guardian.) Lloyd and his collaborators explain:

Since December 27, Israel has deliberately bombed the Islamic University of Gaza, the Ministry of Education, the American International School, at least ten UNRWA schools, one of which was sheltering displaced Palestinian civilians, and tens of other schools and educational facilities.The fact that even Reuters, no friend to Israel, calls the Islamic University a “significant Hamas cultural symbol,” or that, during the three-week war in Gaza alone, Hamas rockets hit nine educational facilities in Israel, including high schools, kindergartens, and elementary schools, goes entirely unremarked by the boycotters. Because Israel is killing scholarship in Gaza (who knew that it existed?), they naturally seek to interfere with Israeli scholars’ efforts to do their work. Specifically, they call upon American scholars to freeze out Israelis who “do not vocally oppose Israeli state policies against Palestine,” and advocate a “comprehensive boycott of Israeli institutions . . . including suspension of all forms of funding and subsidies to these institutions.”

Although consumer boycotts are increasingly common in America—economic researchers have found that they quadrupled in the period from the mid-1980’s to mid-1990’s—an academic boycott is a relatively new and untried thing. Two and a half years ago, a British boycott of Israeli scholars and universities lasted all of three weeks. It is, however, a familiar class weapon, or pastime. Most participants in consumer boycotts are high-income college graduates. The Scholars for Peace in the Middle East have started a petition drive to oppose and denounce the boycott, observing that “singling out Israeli academics and institutions for boycott is discriminatory. No other nation’s academics or institutions are being subjected to such action, whether or not their governments are in a state of war.”

While this is true, it misses the target. Victor Davis Hanson points out that those, like the academic boycotters, who complain about the deaths of many Palestinian Arabs at Israeli hands were strangely silent when “Russians blew apart 40,000 plus Muslims from the center of Grozny.” But though it will never happen, they could break their silence. They could protest what Hanson calls the Turkish Muslim occupation of Cyprus now in its fourth decade just as loudly as they protest that the “unilateral ceasefire declared by Israel . . . inaugurates a new phase of occupation of Gaza.” It is theoretically possible, even if it is completely implausible. The real problem is not that Israel is singled out, but that the academic boycott of Israel is one more turn of the screw in the abuse and corruption of American scholarship. The boycott is a nakedly political act, devised to influence Israeli policy, by using scholarly exchange as a coercive force.

In addition to its spokesman David Lloyd, the boycott’s organizing committee includes: Mohammed Abed, a philosopher at Cal State Los Angeles; Rabab Abdulhadi, an ethnic studies professor at San Francisco State; Lara Deeb, a women’s studies professor at Irvine and open advocate on behalf of Hezbollah; Manzar Foorohar, a historian at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo; Jess Ghannam, a psychiatrist at the University of California’s medical college in San Francisco and a longtime PLO flack who is president of the local chapter of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee; Sherna Berger Gluck, a women’s studies professor at Cal State Long Beach and author of An American Feminist in Palestine; Sondra Hale, an anthropologist at UCLA; David Klein, a mathematician at Cal State Northridge; Dennis Kortheuer, a professor of education at Cal State Long Beach; Sunaina Maira, an Asian American studies professor at Davis; Marcy Newman, an English professor at An Najah National University in Nablus; Edie Pistolesi, a professor of art education at Cal State Northridge who gave her students the assignment of contributing to an anti-war display; and Magid Shihade, a visiting professor of Middle Eastern studies at Davis who also participates in something called resistance studies.

Lloyd himself is a self-identified Marxist (“the failure of the emancipatory promise of Marxism . . . does not necessarily entail the judgement that [its] analytical and theoretical insights have nothing more of value to tell us”) who teaches at the University of Southern California. The group was wise to choose someone with a fine Welsh name to speak for it, since the last thing it wants is to be understood as merely an American propaganda arm of the Arab boycott.

That’s what it is, however. The Arab League organized its boycott of Palestinian Jews in 1946 when it established a Permanent Boycott Committee and declared: “Products of Palestinian Jews are to be considered undesirable in Arab countries. They should be prohibited and refused as long as their production in Palestine might lead to the realization of Zionist political aims.” The academic boycott seeks what Hamas calls for in its charter and has failed to achieve so far—the destruction of the Jewish State. Thus it is terrorism by other means.

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

History and theory of the novel

Mark Thwaite has been thinking about the history of the novel, and asks what should be on his reading list. Here is an introductory (not a comprehensive) list of fifty some titles.

• Allen, Walter. The English Novel: A Short Critical History. London: Phoenix House, 1954.
• Allott, Miriam, ed. Novelists on the Novel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
• Bell, Michael Davitt. The Problem of American Realism: Studies in the Cultural History of a Literary Idea. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
• Bewley, Marius. The Eccentric Design: Form in the Classic American Novel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
• Bissell, Frederick O., Jr. Fielding’s Theory of the Novel. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1933.
• Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
• Bridgman, Richard. The Colloquial Style in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.
• Brown, Herbert R. The Sentimental Novel in America, 1789–1860. Durham, N.Car.: Duke University Press, 1940.
• Butler, Marilyn. Jane Austen and the War of Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
• Cecil, Lord David. Early Victorian Novelists: Essays in Revaluation. London: Constable, 1934.
• Chase, Richard. The American Novel and Its Tradition. New York: Doubleday, 1957.
• Cross, Wilbur L. The Development of the English Novel. New York: Macmillan, 1933.
• Davis, Lennard J. Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
• Day, Geoffrey. From Fiction to the Novel. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
• Dillard, Annie. Living by Fiction. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
• Dryden, Edgar A. The Form of American Romance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
• Fiedler, Leslie A. Love and Death in the American Novel. New York: Criterion, 1960.
• Forster, E. M. Aspects of the Novel. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927.
• Halperin, John, ed. The Theory of the Novel: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
• James, Henry. The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces. Ed. R. P. Blackmur. New York: Scribner’s, 1934.
• ———. Theory of Fiction. Ed. James E. Miller. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.
• Jefferson, Ann. The Nouveau Roman and the Poetics of Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
• Karl, Frederick R. The Adversary Literature: The English Novel in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1974.
• ———. An Age of Fiction: The Nineteenth-Century British Novel. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1964.
• ———. American Fictions, 1940–1980: A Comprehensive History and Critical Evaluation. New York: Harper & Row, 1983.
• Kazin, Alfred. On Native Grounds: An Interpretation of Modern American Prose Literature. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942.
• Kermode, Frank. The Art of Telling: Essays on Fiction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
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• Liddell, Robert. On the Novel. Ed. Wayne C. Booth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
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• Martin, H. C. Style in Prose Fiction. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
• Maxwell, D. E. S. American Fiction: The Intellectual Background. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
• McKeon, Michael. The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
• Minter, David L. A Cultural History of the American Novel: Henry James to William Faulkner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
• Mizener, Arthur. The Sense of Life in the Modern Novel. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.
• Muir, Edwin. The Structure of the Novel. London: Woolf, 1928.
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• Roberts, Thomas J. When Is Something Fiction? Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
• Sacks, Sheldon. Fiction and the Shape of Belief. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
• Seidel, Michael. Exile and the Narrative Imagination. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
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• Van Doren, Carl. The American Novel, 1789–1939. Rev.ed. New York: Macmillan, 1940.
• Van Ghent, Dorothy. The English Novel: Form and Function. New York: Rinehart, 1953.
• Vernon, John. Money and Fiction: Literary Realism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984.
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Reconsidering Updike

Many stirring and provocative reactions to John Updike’s death yesterday at seventy-six. The best, of course, belongs to Patrick Kurp, who adopts a wise autobiographical strategy, laying out the course of his Updike reading. Kurp finally prefers Updike as a critic, describing him as an “indefatigable teacher.” He quotes from essays on Nabokov, Henry Green, Daniel Fuchs, and William Maxwell. One of my favorite passages is when Updike opens an essay on two avant-garde satirists by commenting on the way their books are printed:

Sans-serif type belongs to one of those futures that never occurred. Elegantly simple, jauntily functional, it was everything the Bauhaus thought modernity should be, yet except in posters and telephone books it never really caught on. As with so many oddities a revolution would sweep away, serifs exist for a purpose: they help the eye pick up the shape of the letter. Piquant in little amounts, sans-serif in page-size sheets repels readership as wax paper repels water; it has a sleazy, cloudy look.Updike could not have foreseen another revolution, which swept sans serif back in as the primary typeface of the internet. How many critics, though, would open a review with such a passage? Updike was that old-fashioned creature—a bookman.

Others are equally sober and on point, and not merely because the news of death chastens a prose style. Levi Asher turns out to be an unexpected Updike fan. After a young man’s easy contempt, viewing him as the “smirking epitome of the American literary establishment” and “claim[ing] to dislike him”—such honesty is rare in any critic—Asher came to realize that Updike was among his “very favorite living writers.” He calls Couples the masterpiece, but also singles out for praise Too Far To Go, Marry Me, Gertrude and Claudius, “and his great volumes of generous, gorgeously composed literary criticism.”

The number of critics who expressed reservations about him on the occasion of Updike’s death is striking. Clark DeLeon found him too “suburban,” picturing him as Rob Petrie living in New Rochelle, working at the New Yorker, and “instead of tripping over the ottoman on his way in the door, stumbled into bed with a neighbor’s wife.” Terry Teachout never succeeded in liking Updike’s writing, but friends whose taste he trusted kept telling him he was wrong. In the end he abandoned the effort to correct his own taste, deciding that “Updike was one of those undeniably important artists, like Wagner or Dreiser, to whose virtues [he] would always be deaf.”

Was Updike an undeniably important artist? As Kurp says, he had a “Jamesian fecundity.” (I am reminded of the old joke about Jacob Neusner, who at last count had written or edited over nine hundred and fifty books. A friend calls Neusner on the phone. His wife answers. “Can you hold on a minute?” she asks. “Jake is finishing a book.”) Such fecundity mars a living (or recently dead) writer’s reputation, making it difficult to sort good from mediocre, leading to the temptation, as Teachout found himself doing when it came time to prune back his library, of discarding everything. The shoulder-to-shoulder phalanx of books, published from the beginning by Alfred A. Knopf in a uniform edition, has a sleazy, cloudy look. Perhaps, though, what J. V. Cunningham said of Edwin Arlington Robinson is equally true of Updike: “Though he wrote too much, he wrote much that was distinctive and good, and even in the dull wastes there are fragments.”

Last night, determined to give Updike another try, I picked up a novel that I recalled enjoying when it was first published—The Coup. It was Updike’s attempt to do postcolonial Africa, to be named with Naipaul. I made it as far as a passage that I had scored back in 1978, scribbling in the margin: “This is the kind of thing Updike doesn’t do enough of. His usual shimmering effects are no longer than a phrase, sometimes no more than a word.” The dictator of Kush, Hakim Félix Ellelloû, is reflecting back on the Soviet military advisers who have been posted to his country for the past two years. An analogy occurs to him which is “clarifying”:[W]ith their taut pallor, bristling hair devoid of a trace of a curl, oval eyes, short limbs, and tightly packed bodies whose muscular energy seemed drawn into a knot at the back of their necks, these Russians reminded me of nothing so much as the reckless, distasteful packs of wild swine that when I was a child would come north from the bogs by the river to despoil the vegetable plantings of our village. They had a bristling power and toughness, to be sure, but lacked both the weighty magic of the lion and the hippo and the weightless magic of the gazelle and the shrike, so that the slaughter of one with spears and stones, as he squealed and dodged—the boars were not easy to kill—took place in an incongruous hubbub of laughter. Even in death their eyes kept that rheumy glint whereby the hunted betray the pressures under which they live.Upon rereading it, I could no longer understand what had first impressed me about the passage. I realized that I would have to leave the reconsideration of Updike to others, or to the “test of time.” I rolled over, put out the light, and went to sleep.

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

In memoriam: Douglas A. Brooks


Douglas A. Brooks, associate professor of English at Texas A&M University, editor of the Shakespeare Yearbook, and author of From Playhouse to Printing House: Drama and Authorship in Early Modern England, described by one of his students as “Best professor on the planet,” died this afternoon of the lung cancer that he had battled for eight months. He was fifty-two, and a fairly new father (his son Judah was born in December 2005). He can never be replaced.

Update. The official university obituary:

Douglas A. Brooks, 52, associate professor of English at Texas A&M University, died on Tuesday afternoon (Jan. 27). He was in treatment for cancer in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and was hospitalized at the time of his death.

The Department of English is planning a local memorial for Dr. Brooks, tentatively on Friday, Feb. 20.

Dr. Brooks came to Texas A&M in September 1997 [from Columbia University, where he earned his Ph.D.], and had been an English faculty member for 11 years. [Before earning his Ph.D., he had been a rabbinical student at Jewish Theological Seminary. Brooks was the grandson of the Yiddish writer Abraham Buchshteyn.] His area of concentration is early modern literature in English with focuses on drama, book history, and gender studies. A popular and engaging teacher, Dr. Brooks’s passion for the classroom had been recognized with two university teaching awards. He coordinated the Liberal Arts Honors Program for several years. In addition, Dr. Brooks spent countless hours mentoring students at Texas A&M.

A respected scholar, Dr. Brooks served as editor of the Shakespeare Yearbook, an international journal of Shakespeare scholarship. He had edited four books, authored 10 journal articles and 10 book chapters. He was working on a new manuscript at the time of his passing.

Dr. Brooks especially loved Shakespeare, and took great strides to introduce students to the English author. He was selected to deliver the very first Freshman Academic Convocation at Texas A&M in August 2003. The title of his presentation was “A Tale of Two Shakespeares.” He served as faculty advisor for the Texas A&M Shakespeare Festival during his 11 years at the university.

In an email to English majors, Dr. Jimmie Killingsworth, professor of English and head of the department said: “Like you, I was honored to know Douglas Brooks, to spend time in the glow of his brilliance, to hear his zany laugh, and have him as a close friend and colleague. We will all miss him.”

Update, II: M. Jimmie Killingsworth, head of the English department at Texas A&M University, has distributed a notice, asking anyone who wishes to write a note of condolence to address it to Douglas’s son, Judah Rosner, in care of him [killingsworth at tamu dot edu]. The notes will be gathered together and preserved with other memorabilia until Judah is old enough to read them for himself.

Updike dead at 76

The novelist and critic John Updike has died at seventy-six of lung cancer in a hospice outside Boston.

I have never been an Updike fan, and have criticized him repeatedly on this Commonplace Blog. See here and here and here and here. He stood for a conception of literature, an approach to both the novel and criticism, that has exercised a corrupting influence. More perhaps than anyone since the Second World War, Updike championed a highly “literary” fiction, precious, breathy, self-congratulatorily “beautiful,” that was largely an effort to dress up and give a good name to the novel of moral uplift. He was E. D. E. N. Southworth or Susan Warner with a fancy prose style. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, the New York Times obituary writer, quotes James Wood’s opinion: “He is a prose writer of great beauty, but that prose confronts one with the question of whether beauty is enough, and whether beauty always conveys all that a novelist must convey.” But I am unwilling to grant Wood’s premise.

Here is the famous scene at the beginning of Rabbit, Run in which the former high-school basketball star, now twenty-six, joins a boys’ pickup game. He is watching from the sidelines when the ball clanks off the rim and lands at his feet.

He catches it on the short bounce with a quickness that startles them. As they stare hushed he sights squinting through blue clouds of weed smoke, a suddenly dark silhouette like a smokestack against the afternoon spring sky, setting his feet with care, wiggling the ball with nervousness in front of his chest, one widespread white hand on top of the ball and the other underneath, jiggling it patiently to get some adjustment in air itself. The cuticle moons on his fingernails are big. Then the ball seems to ride up the right lapel of his coat and comes off his shoulders as his knees dip down, and it appears the ball will miss because though he shot from an angle the ball is not going toward the backboard. It was not aimed there. It drops into the circle of the rim, whipping the net with a ladylike whisper. “Hey!” he shouts in pride.If he is a dark silhouette how is it possible to see his big cuticles? The sentences are unrelated to each other, entirely self-involved. What is “air itself”? Or perhaps more to the point, when would air not be itself? When he shoots the ball, from an angle, Rabbit is its agent—he is the shooter—but when the ball is in the air, it becomes the passive object of an unseen force (“It was not aimed there”). In the next sentence, though, the ball transforms itself into a subject, and it drops. Three it’s in a row—each with a different grammatical function, making a muddle.

And this doesn’t even glance at the creep of the passage. Reading it, you say under your breath, “Shoot the damn thing already.” You expect one of the boys to dart over and swat the ball out of Rabbit’s hands. (Rabbit? He makes Shaquille O’Neal seem quick.)

But I ought to speak with respect of the dead. Updike was a helpful and sometimes even penetrating critic, given the limitations of his own conception of literature. His best novel, for my money, remains Rabbit Redux (1971). Updike had the unique ability to write with understanding about those of a different and lower social class. He may have written too much, but the fact that he kept writing suggests that he did not look upon perfection of the work as the writer’s purpose. His purpose was simply to live with words—with thoughts turned into words, as he somewhat imprecisely put it. Even if his own writing did not appeal to you, you had to wish for more such men with such an unshakable commitment to literature.

Yitgadal v'yitkadash. . . .

Monday, January 26, 2009

The only permitted kind

Texas A&M University has formed a committee to explore institutional procedures “to foster greater respect on campus and to strengthen a culture that encourages civil dialogue.” Who can possibly hold out against civil dialogue? You might worry a little about the narrowing of civility’s meaning to R-E-S-P-E-C-T. You might be haunted by the loss of an older meaning, where civility denoted, not a relationship founded upon deferential regard or esteem, but a common observance of common decencies, including common mistakes. You might even think that the best procedure for encouraging civil dialogue would be to foster a respect, not for persons, but for the fallacy of the argumentum ad personem.

You would be wrong, of course. The dean of liberal arts explains:

The overarching purpose for the Advisory Committee on Civil Dialogue is to foster the ability of Texas A&M University faculty, staff, and students to engage difference in today’s multicultural globalized society through civil dialogue. By “difference” we mean any distinction that people draw between themselves and others as reflected in their values, beliefs, and attitudes that is informed by ideology, religion, cultural heritage, race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. By “civil dialogue” we mean a form of communication that allows people to express vigorously their opinions and points of view, but in a way that contributes to rigorous and constructive deliberation on significant issues and empowers personal and professional relationships. The ability to engage difference productively, particularly those differences we find difficult and challenging, is crucial for sustaining democratic practice within society, generating collaboration among people and institutions, and creating innovation in business, governmental, nonprofit, and community enterprises.Again, you were wrong to suppose that in dialogue you engage, not “difference,” but disagreement. As you ought to have understood long before now, the most important human question at present is how people draw distinctions between themselves and others—how they demand to be respected, or at least not to be offended.

I need to distinguish myself from you in order to be personally “empowered.” That distinction might reside, not in me, but in what I have done or made—not a chance. So much for the older concept of dialogue in which I surrendered to a common pursuit of truth; and if I were personally disempowered by being proved mistaken, all to the good. What was encouraged was the common pursuit, not personal empowerment. Our relationship, yours and mine, was substantive. We may have pursued different conclusions, but we pursued them to the same end—the end of truth. To borrow from C. S. Lewis, we were not lovers, who gaze into each other’s eyes, but friends who turn and look off in the same direction.

For some time now, the university—not just in College Station—has been transforming itself from an institution that is distinguished by substantive relationships (a common allegiance to truth) into a social institution where a respect for persons, overbalancing into an obsession with personal difference, is the dominant note. In such an institution, the pressure to avoid substantive disagreements, to treat a difference of opinion as just another distinction that people draw between themselves and others, can be overwhelming. But since civility can decline into a merely formal relationship, a polite lack of interest, the countervailing pressure builds up to consider “difference” itself as substantive. We become absorbed in each other’s race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. Albeit with respect rather than love, we gaze unprotestingly into each other’s eyes.

The last time I advanced this claim, I was accused of pushing aside history and yearning for a Golden Age that never existed. But I am talking about the idea of the university. I am holding out for civil dialogue, not as a social practice by which various members of a community are affirmed in their distinctiveness, but as an ideal by which the university is distinguished from other human institutions. Under such an ideal, arguments from personal difference are axiomatically false. In the new social university, where personal differences are elevated to the status of non-negotiable demands, argumentum ad personem may be the only permitted kind.

Sunday, January 25, 2009

More recommendations

The National Book Critics’ Circle has announced its five finalists for the best work of fiction published last year. They are:

• Roberto Bolaño, 2666
• Marilynne Robinson, Home
• Aleksandar Hemon, The Lazarus Project
• M. Glenn Taylor, The Ballad of Trenchmouth Taggart
• Elizabeth Strout, Olive Kittredge

If Bolaño does not win the award, I will never make another literary-award prediction. In the mean time, here are a few more recommendations from around the web.

Jane Urquhart, whose own novel The Underpainter would qualify, opens a new series in the Globe and Mail dedicated to “books that have been unjustly overlooked, under-praised or just ignored.” Her choice is Penelope Fitzgerald’s Blue Flower. A “sensual feast,” she calls it, set in the “physical and intellectual world of 18th-century Germany.”

Peter Stothard, who is owed a hat tip for the above, offers his own suggestions, starting with David Storey’s Flight into Camden. Stothard calls it “magnificent,” although he is not sure he wants to reread it.

Critic and Brooklyn College professor Jonathan Baumbach says that if he had to choose a single book to recommend by Robert Coover it would be “the playful, mock-pornographic” Spanking the Maid.

After admitting that he was underwhelmed with the “self-consuming scrutiny” of John Haskell’s Out of My Skin, Mark Sarvas is offering a giveaway copy of The Siege, an early book by the Albanian novelist Ismail Kadare.

Patrick Kurp is taken with Chekhov: Scenes from a Life, in which Rosamund Bartlett “looks at the writer through the lens of geography.” Reading about Chekhov’s childhood on the steppes, Kurp is reminded of “Willa Cather’s Nebraska novels [O Pioneers!, My Ántonia, and A Lost Lady], Conrad Richter’s The Sea of Grass and of Melville’s little-known “John Marr”—thereby offering five more recommendations.

John Foley, a teacher at Ridgefield High School in Washington, wants Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Of Mice and Men, and To Kill a Mockingbird dropped from the English curriculum. Don’t misunderstand him. He loves the novels; they are “American classics.” But in the age of Obama, “novels that use the ‘N-word’ repeatedly need to go.” Foley nominates David Guterson’s Snow Falling on Cedars, Tim O’Brien’s Going After Cacciato, and Larry McMurtry’s Lonesome Dove as replacements. Now I am beginning to understand my students’ woeful lack of literary preparation for college-level work.

The Wife of Martin Guerre

The incredible odyssey of Martin Guerre, as an early French version of the story called it, has proved endlessly alluring. It served as the basis of two films, Daniel Vigne’s Retour de Martin Guerre (1983) and Jon Amiel’s Sommersby a decade later, and a musical by Claude-Michel Schönberg and Alain Boublil in 1996. The Princeton historian Natalie Zemon Davis wrote a detailed account, under a translation of Vigne’s title (she was credited as the film’s historical adviser), which was published the same year as a kind of appendix.

Publicly at least no one connected with any of these projects singled out Janet Lewis’s novel The Wife of Martin Guerre (San Francisco: Colt Press, 1941) as the obvious forerunner of their efforts. Davis mentions the book in a footnote, dismissing it as “charming,” an epithet reserved for trifles. Lewis’s compact 100-page novel, the first full-length treatment in English of the sixteenth-century French legal case, may be many things, but it is neither charming nor a trifle. On the occasion of Lewis’s death in 1998 at the age of ninety-nine, the New York Times ventured that “there are many who will assure you that when the literary history of the second millennium is written . . . in the category of dazzling American short fiction her Wife of Martin Guerre will be regarded as the 20th century’s Billy Budd and Janet Lewis will be ranked with Herman Melville.” The strangeness of the comparison ought not be allowed to weaken the judgment. The Wife of Martin Guerre is one the last century’s great novels.

In 1539 in the French Pyrenees village of Artigues, two children—a girl of eleven and a boy no older—are wed in a Roman Catholic ceremony, joining two ancient landowning families. The marriage of Bertrande de Rols to Martin Guerre gets off to a rocky start as the young husband seems standoffish, even hostile to his bride. But in time the two become loyal lovers. Or, as Lewis writes, “gradually Bertrande’s affection for her husband became a deep and joyous passion, growing slowly and naturally as her body grew.” Then the peace of their young lives is shattered and the couple is exposed to “the vagaries of a malicious fate.” Martin steals a planting field of grain from his harsh retributive father, and fearing the old man’s anger, flees his native village. He swears to Bertrande that he will be gone but a short time—eight days at most. He is gone for eight years.

The man who returns to Bertrande is much changed. He is now thickset, “broader in the shoulder, developed, mature.” More than that, he is kinder and has acquired wisdom and charm. As the curé at Artigues says later, “His selfishness has become generosity, his impatience has become energy well-directed.” Since the elder Guerre has died in his absence, Martin takes over authority for the family farm. Peace seems to have been restored. By degrees, however, the suspicion grows that this Martin Guerre is not the same as the man who fled eight years before. At length he is accused of being an impostor and clapped in irons. The first trial, at Rieux, the nearest bishopric, ends in a verdict of guilt and a sentence of death. The case is appealed to the parliament at Toulouse, and there the accused man is on the verge of being declared innocent when a peglegged soldier clomps into the courtroom and announces himself as the true Martin Guerre. Martin’s sisters, long supporters of the man who returned to the farm, gasp and switch their allegiance to the newcomer. Bertrande falls weeping before the man and begs his pardon. Seeing how the case has turned against him, the impostor confesses himself to be a wandering rogue by the name of Arnaud du Tilh. He is convicted of “the several crimes of imposture, falsehood, substitution of name and person, adultery, rape, sacrilege, plagiat, which is the detention of a person who properly belongs to another, and of larceny,” and is hanged in front of Martin Guerre’s house in Artigues.

Such is the story. But Janet Lewis tells it very differently from the later filmmakers and musical producers. The most striking difference is the identity of Arnaud du Tilh’s accuser. In the more recent dramatized versions, Martin’s uncle Pierre, angered by his nephew’s demand for a share of the profits earned by the farm during his absence, sets upon the man and has him arrested. In The Wife of Martin Guerre, however, Bertrande is the accuser. Although she has “rejoiced in the presence of this new Martin even more than in that of the old,” she becomes convinced that he is not her true husband. She confronts him, demanding proof of his identity:

“When I was in Brittany,” [replies] her husband, “I heard a strange story of a man who was also a wolf, and there may also have been times when the soul of one man inhabited the body of another. But it is also notorious that men who have been great sinners have become saints. What would become of us all if we had no power to turn from evil toward good?”Thus a central doctrine of the Church reinforces Arnaud du Tilh’s false claim to be the husband of Bertrande de Rols. In this way the rogue quiets his lover’s suspicions, for she is a strict Catholic. The suspicions horrify her. If they are true, she is an adulteress and has committed a mortal sin. But Bertrande allows herself to be temporarily convinced by the man sharing her bed. “For,” as she tells him, “God knows I do not wish you to be otherwise than my true husband.” She loves him passionately, and as Lewis gently hints, it is a sexual passion as well as the ardor of the heart.

Suspicion will not be silenced. The man is not her true husband, and Bertrande comes to know it. Knowing it, how can she do else than to accuse him? She is ruled by beliefs, and furthermore she knows what she believes, for she has been told. To modern readers this is apt to make Bertrande seem like a fool. In an interview in the Southern Review, Lewis acknowledged that “contemporary reactions” to Bertrande “are very amusing.” Most readers “are impatient with her. They say, ‘Why didn’t she take what she had,’ and so forth.” Most readers are disappointed with Bertrande for betraying their own beliefs.

They would seem to be the ideal audience for the films and musical. In these Bertrande is ruled, not by Catholic doctrine, but by the modern conviction of the absolute value of sexual passion. Despite threats and coercion by her uncle, she never turns against the man she knows is not Martin. Even after she has fallen to her knees before her true husband, Bertrande remains faithful in her heart to her false lover. She gives a start and a cry when he is hanged. All very touching—but not particularly true to the values of Renaissance France. Bertrande was not a modern woman, and it is a mistake to assign her modern beliefs.

Lewis does not make this mistake. She is not interested in adding to the literature of passionate love. The Wife of Martin Guerre is a tragedy in which passion is sacrificed to the legal demands of marriage, even if happiness is the victim. As in any tragedy, the incidents in the novel are first astonishing, then fearful in the extreme. The man who claims to be Martin Guerre bears such a close resemblance to the real Martin Guerre—the same two broken teeth, a scar on the same eyebrow, a drop of blood in the same place in the same eye—that it is uncanny. This astonishment raises the fear that the remarkable poseur will be unmasked and put to death. When that in fact happens, fear is converted to pity. The pity is made all the keener by the recognition that it could not have been different. History that is the original of the plot demands du Tilh’s death, regardless of how appealing the rogue is.

A commonplace of modern literary thought is that “the tragic mode is not available,” Lionel Trilling says, “even to the gravest and noblest of our writers.” Perhaps it is not surprising that Lewis, the wife of the reactionary critic Yvor Winters, would have ignored the commonplaces of modern literary thought. But her novel goes further. Published at the end of Auden’s “low dishonest decade,” it has the effect of calling into question the literary values of the age—the self-important difficulty, the grandiose incoherence, the rage at all costs to be New, even if that ends in the pursuit of evil. The Wife of Martin Guerre commits none of these. It is an austere and renunciatory work. It has no clever and yackety “voice.” It is written in a plain, expository style—a style of great suppleness and beauty, but nevertheless a chill style—which does not belong to Lewis but to an older tradition. Although she also wrote other novels of distinction—in particular The Trial of Søren Quist—none rivals The Wife of Martin Guerre. As do few other novels of the twentieth century.

The Wife of Martin Guerre remains in print from Swallow Press, an imprint of Ohio University Press.

Friday, January 23, 2009

Working definition of literature

Jim H., author of Wisdom of the West, says in a comment to an earlier post: “ ‘Literature’ is simply too vague and amorphous a concept to nail down in a couple [of] blog posts.” If I agreed with that, I’d give up blogging.

Here then is my working definition. It consists of two disjunctive claims, the second of which was copyrighted by E. D. Hirsch. Literature is either everything written or only some of it. If it is the former, and if it is to be studied, then it must be reduced to manageable proportions by means of some arbitrary category—arbitrary to avoid the introduction of value—such as a language, a country, or a historical period (these examples do not exhaust the possible categories). If it is the latter then either it is what someone stipulates, in which case it can be whatever one pleases, or it is what authorities have called “literature” (that is, it has a historical definition).

The former is literature according to philology; the latter, according to criticism.

Speaking as a critic, then—conceiving of literature as only some of what has been written—I stipulate that “Literature is simply good writing—where ‘good’ has, by definition, no fixed definition.” But this definition is not the same as my saying elsewhere that “Literature just is a selection of masterpieces.” This later statement is another way of observing that, when literature is no longer everything that has ever been written, it is what pleases one to dignify with the name and status of literature. It is a selection of masterpieces.

Right now, late on a Friday afternoon, with my sons clamoring for me to play with them, I cannot think of an exception. For modesty’ sake, though, I shall continue to speak of it as a working definition.

Reduction versus expansion

Here is a test. How you answer will clarify whether your view of literature is reductive or expansive. On November 13, 1913, the New York Times ran an article listing the “Hundred Best Books of the Year.” To make the test easier, I shall confine the list to the fiction titles:

( 1.) Edith Wharton, The Custom of the Country
( 2.) Arnold Bennett, The Old Adam
( 3.) Willa Cather, O Pioneers!
( 4.) Winston Churchill, The Inside of the Cup
( 5.) Frank Danby, Concert Pitch
( 6.) Conigsby Dawson, The Garden without Walls
( 7.) John Galsworthy, The Dark Flower
( 8.) Ellen Glasgow, Virginia
( 9.) Thomas Hardy, A Changed Man and Other Tales
(10.) William Dean Howells, New Leaf Mills
(11.) Henry Sydnor Harrison, V. V.’s Eyes
(12.) William J. Locke, Stella Maris
(13.) Jack London, John Barleycorn
(14.) Charles Marriott, The Catfish
(15.) Meredith Nicholson, Otherwise Phyllis
(16.) Mary S. Watts, Van Cleve

These sixteen were chosen from among a larger lot of novels published in 1913, including:

• Eleanor Hallowell Abbott, White Linen Nurse
• Miriam Alexander, Ripple
• Mary Austin, Green Bough: A Tale of the Resurrection
• Rex Beach, Iron Trail: An Alaskan Romance
• E. C. Bentley, Woman in Black
• Joseph Conrad, Chance
• Frank Barkley Copley, The Impeachment of President Israels
• Mary Stewart Cutting, Refractory Husbands
• Richard Harding Davis, Soldiers of Fortune
• Ellen Douglas Deland, Country Cousins
• Thomas Dixon, The Southerner: A Romance of the Real Lincoln
• Arthur Conan Doyle, The Poison Belt
• Jeffrey Farnol, The Amateur Gentleman
• Edna Ferber, Roast Beef, Medium: The Business Adventures of Emma McChesney
• Justus Miles Forman, The Opening Door: A Story of the Woman’s Movement
• L. P. Gratacap, Benjamin the Jew
• David Hennessey, The Outlaw (“Second prize in Hodder & Stoughton’s £1,000 Novel Competition”)
• D. H. Lawrence, Sons and Lovers
• Jack London, The Valley of the Moon
• Ivan Morgan Merlinjones, The Reclamation of Wales: A Patriotic Romance Founded on Facts
• Oscar Micheaux, The Conquest: The Story of a Negro Pioneer
• L. M. Montgomery, The Golden Road
• George Moore, Elizabeth Cooper
• Samuel W. Odell, The Princess Athura: A Romance of Iran
• Thomas Nelson Page, The Land of the Spirit
• Albert Bigelow Paine, “Peanut”: The Story of a Boy
• Eleanor H. Porter, Pollyanna
• Sax Rohmer, The Insidious Dr. Fu Manchu
• Hugh Walpole, Fortitude: Being a True and Faithful Account of the Education of an Explorer
• Hawley Williams, Five Yards to Go!
• P. G. Wodehouse, The Little Nugget
• Leonard Woolf, The Village in the Jungle
• Harold Bell Wright, The Winning of Barbara Worth

I will not hide from you that I enjoy book lists. The Guardian’s music blogger may be right when he says that “List-makers mummify their subject matter. Everything they touch calcifies and turns to dust.” Or lists may be a necessary prelude to judgment, organizing the materials for closer examination. Or they may only be a harmless waste of time.

At all events, the above is a fairly thorough list of the fiction published in English in 1913. What on it is literature, and what is not?

I would suggest, again, that there are only two possible answers. Some of it is literature, or all of it is. If the former then “literature” is an award for prestige and belongs to criticism; if the latter then it is “Everything written in c” where c is a category that more or less arbitrarily reduces everything written to manageable proportions (even “fiction published in English in 1913” is such a category), and then literature belongs to philology. Literature is a vacuous term unless its meaning is narrowly—reductively—specified.

Thursday, January 22, 2009

Literature and status

Daniel Green has harsh words for my assertion that “Literature is just a selection of masterpieces.” (If I had it to write over again, I’d start the proposition with an indefinite article, but otherwise, upon reflection, I’d change nothing. Literature is created by critics in the activity of selecting works to prize, preserve, and pass on. It is what remains of everything that is written.) “There is no getting around this obstacle,” I had said. “The problem is what criteria of selection you are going to use.”

Without pausing to consider what I mean by the word literature, Green is contemptuous of my view:

I really can’t imagine a more reductive and, especially for a literary scholar who professes to love literature, a more implicitly dismissive view of the value of literature and literary study. It’s all about choosing up sides and announcing that your “criteria” are better than the other side’s?A selection is a reduction; so I suppose my view is reductive. Green assumes that he and I mean the same thing when we say “literature,” but we don’t. He believes in literariness, the Loch Ness Monster of criticism, a mythical creature who lives beneath the surface of literary texts, endowing them with special significance. The idea derives from Roman Jakobson, who introduced the term in an essay written in 1933 to describe (and reinforce) “the autonomy of the aesthetic function.” “Literariness,” he explained years later, is “the transformation of a verbal act into a poetic work and the system of devices that bring about such a transformation. . . .”[1]

What is poetry on this definition, however, but a selection of verbal acts? Try to specify the system of devices that bring about the transformation of mere words into poetry. Here is the single best attempt that I know. “How shall the poem be written?” J. V. Cunningham asked. “I answer, In metrical language.” But any such specification will exclude many works that some people consider poetry and include other works that they do not. (Elizabeth Alexander is out, Ella Wheeler Wilcox is in.) Cunningham is aware of the problem: “[I]t is clear from what is being published as poetry, approved of and commented on, that there is not only uncertainty with respect to the old tradition but also a widely felt need for some system of meter other than the traditional, and that none has been agreed on and established.”[2] The only thing that has changed in the four decades since Cunningham first wrote these words is that the felt need for a non-traditional prosody has disappeared. Contemporary poets are happy, by and large, to write without system. The old tradition no longer provides an exhaustive store of devices to bring about a transformation of a verbal act into poetry, but nothing has emerged to replace it. Literariness will not do.

Green is shocked—shocked—to read such views from a “literary scholar who professes to love literature.” But I am afraid that I must shock him even more deeply, because I cannot remember professing to “love literature” (not at least since I have grown up), and cannot imagine what it would mean to do so. I love some books and cannot abide others. I cannot abide many of the books that Green professes to love, and some of the books that I love he would not even acknowledge as literature. I love Democracy in America, for example, and Haim Kaplan’s Holocaust diary; Michael Wyschogrod’s Body of Faith, a theology of Judaism, and Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down; A. J. Liebling’s boxing reports and Karen Horney’s studies of neurosis; Michael Oakeshott’s philosophical essays and Ronald Knox’s history of Enthusiasm. Each of these is a literary masterpiece, I would argue. And I should very much like to hear Green’s argument to the contrary.

My view was stated with admirable definitiveness by E. D. Hirsch Jr., who similarly held that Darwin’s Origin of Species was a literary masterpiece. Although a scornful critic had said that he was “clearly capable of distinguishing” The Origin of Species from literature, Hirsch said he was not at all capable—and neither were writers like Stanley Edgar Hyman, who classified Darwin as literature in The Tangled Bank, or editors who included Darwin in anthologies of Victorian literature:Either literature is defined by traits that someone stipulates, in which case literature can be defined as one pleases; or literature is what the authorities call “literature,” in which case The Origin of Species is literature.[3]Green stipulates that literature must be art. In his Reading Experience, he flogs the same merchandise again and again, and still it refuses to move. Thus on May 5, 2008, he wrote: “The important distinction to be made is . . . between those works whose authors think of fiction as primarily an aesthetic form and those who think of it as a form of commentary. . . .” Or on April 24: “One loves Paradise Lost precisely because it is such an aesthetically powerful work despite its rather repellent ‘idea’ of Christianity. It’s the first work I think of when challenged to provide an example of a work of literature in which art trumps content.” Literature is simply Green’s word for written art.

This pleases him, but it does not please me. And it need please no one else. Much that other people accept as literature is not art, and many written works are “artistic” without being literature. By coincidence, while preparing to teach Edith Wharton’s Custom of the Country earlier today, while searching for the clearest definition of Society, I came upon the following passage from Tom Wolfe’s 2006 Jefferson Lecture:Within the ranks of the rich . . . there inevitably developed an inner circle known as Society. Such groups always believed themselves to be graced with “status honor,” as [Max] Weber called it. Status honor existed quite apart from such gross matters as raw wealth and power. Family background, education, manners, dress, cultivation, style of life—these, the ineffable things, were what granted you your exalted place in Society.My claim is that literature (or, rather, Literature) is the writing that has been graced, by critics and scholars and editors, with “status honor.” What grants it its exalted place may be called literariness or art (or any number of other names), but whatever these are, they are, finally, ineffable things.

Update [January 23]: Daniel Green has clarified himself: “[E]verything written in the forms of fiction, poetry, or drama is literature, if the author intends it to be taken as literature. Many writers of popular fiction, for one, don’t.”

But if everything written as fiction is literature, except for that which isn’t, then literature refers to something in addition to its fiction, although Green has still not said what that thing might be. It remains ineffable.
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[1] Roman Jakobson, “A Postscript to the Discussion on Grammar of Poetry,” Diacritics 10 (1980): 22–35.

[2] J. V. Cunningham, “How Shall the Poem be Written?” (1967), in The Collected Essays (Chicago: Swallow, 1976), pp. 256, 258. Emphasis added.

[3] E. D. Hirsch Jr., “Response to Richard M. Coe,” College English 37 (October 1975): 205–06.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

The Adventures of Douglas Bragg

Madison Jones, The Adventures of Douglas Bragg (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2008). 216 pp. $29.95.

At the beginning of the month, I advanced the name of “the now forgotten Madison Jones” as a shining example of “old-fashioned novelists [who] once stood in the background, unmoved by exhortations to dissent from the proven methods for writing fiction, and more interested in writing unpretentious sense than in making a fast name for themselves.” Well-satisfied with my point, I delivered my parting shot: “Are there still writers like that around?”

As it turns out, Madison Jones himself is still around. And at the age of eighty-three he has written his twelfth novel—a southern picaresque entitled The Adventures of Douglas Bragg. That Jones would have been forgotten, even by those who sometime did him seek, is not without explanation. He has not been published by a New York house in a quarter century; his last five novels have appeared under the imprints of university presses and regional publishers in Nashville and Atlanta. While his work has not entirely escaped the notice of literary scholars, their reflections have hardly found prominent venues. A special number of the Chattahoochie Review (Fall 1996) was devoted to Jones, and a book of essays by diverse hands came out four years ago—from the University Press of Southern Denmark.

In his latest, Jones remains much the same as he has been since publishing his first novel The Innocent at the age of thirty-two. He is unpretentious; he is not interested in showing off his literary gifts; he respects the tradition of the novel. If he doesn’t write sentences that melt in the mouth, he continues to display what Charles Poore called, in reviewing his first novel for the New York Times, “a remarkable capacity to see clearly and deeply into the dramatic conflicts of human character caught in the dilemmas of a violently changing time.” He takes seriously the notion of a literary career, which used to involve the self-assigned task of mastering different genres. Jones has written a buckskin epic (Forest of the Night), a protest novel (A Buried Land), an unromantic pastoral (An Exile), a tragedy according to classical rules (A Cry of Absence), an allegory of good and evil (Passage through Gehenna), a historical novel of the Civil War (Nashville 1864). In his latest he contributes to what E. M. Forster calls the “literature of Rogues.”

Forster goes on to call this kind of fiction “dreariest of all, though the Open Road runs it pretty close. . . .” Yet two of the greatest American novels are picaresques; Jones pays homage to them in his very title. And ordinary readers, who don’t have to ask themselves what they are going to write next, have been eager to get their hands on such books at least since 1554 when Lazarillo de Tormes was first published in Spain. All the world loves a lover, but it will abandon its principles for a rogue. Just look at Bill Clinton’s approval ratings. The reckless cunning, hopscotch logic, and narrow-eyed attitude toward life make him as fascinating as an undiscovered tribe.

Jones’s rogue is a twenty-four-year-old college graduate who for the past two years has been, by his own admission, “going nowhere.” He most likely owes his name to Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg, although there was also a Texas hillbilly singer in the fifties named Douglas Bragg. It is, in any case, a recognizably southern name. The year is 1960. His parents are divorced, and Douglas Bragg lives with his mother in “well-off” circumstances in Birmingham, Alabama. Because they are well-off, they are selected by the family to take in Uncle Jack, elderly, impoverished, and a non-stop talker. “No end to his memories,” Douglas says:

He told me about horse races and cockfights and revival meetings and town bullies and coon hunts and outrageous practical jokes, and on and on in a voice only a little coarsened by phlegm in his throat. But of all the subjects in his repertoire, the one he most talked about was, as he called it, the War between the States. He had a lot of books about the War, but it was like he had got his knowledge not from books but from being on hand at the time, which was impossible. He was better than any book.His mother blames Douglas’s aimlessness and inability to hold a job on Uncle Jack’s voluble storytelling. As if to prove her right, Douglas leaves home the same day that she installs Uncle Jack in a “home for old folks.” He hitchhikes out of town.

What follows is, on one level, the usual stuff of a picaresque. In this kind of novel, plot is thrown out—plot, as I put it earlier, in the old sense of a scheme to achieve some end—and what takes its place is a series of unrelated situations which, as the word adventure implies, the rogue comes upon. Again and again he finds himself in what Huck calls a “tight place.” Douglas is picked up outside of Birmingham by a health-elixir salesman who, rounding a corner too fast in his dented Studebaker, sideswipes a police car. He manages to outrun the law, making it back to his mother’s house in a small town not far away. He is worried that he will be tracked down. “The problem had begun to interest me,” Douglas says, “especially since it could not cost me anything.” He cooks up a plan to abandon the car somewhere and report it stolen. “It had become a little like a game,” he reflects, and his plan is offered “in the gaming spirit.”

Douglas is wrong, though, about its not costing him anything. The salesman and his mother adopt his plan, but then accuse him of stealing the car. Douglas is tossed in jail—until he cooks up another plan to get himself sprung. The pattern of the novel is set. Douglas finds himself trapped in the service of a pig farmer who nurses him back to health after he is mugged, but when Douglas tries to run away, the farmer reports him to a friendly sheriff as a thief, and he is borne back to servitude. Until he cooks up a plan, etc. The fun lies in the contest between Douglas’s roguish wits and the doggedness of those who would put him under restraint.

While the pattern is unbroken, the fun turns to shame when Douglas meets another rogue like himself. After getting busted on a drug charge while trying to escape a dealer who fronts as an undertaker, Douglas is given a suspended sentence of six months—as long as he remains under the supervision of a “preacher and upright man” with a little farm in addition to his church. After his farm chores, he must endure “daily sessions with the Reverend” in which they study the Bible together. Douglas soon infers that he is not the first young man whom the Reverend had got hold of to serve both as “a farmhand and a helpless victim to instruct about Salvation.” On a Friday night in town—he is permitted to go to a movie approved by the Reverend—he meets a light-hearted predecessor to whom Douglas takes an immediate liking:He had a dry way of putting things and, as I soon learned, a readiness to talk about himself and his experiences even when his narrations didn’t exactly cast the best light on him. . . . He even touched on minor criminal acts of his: peccadilloes, as he saw them, like one I had never known anybody to actually do: yell “Fire” in a crowded theater. And when I asked why he had been arrested, he described, dramatically and with obvious pleasure, just how it felt to punch a cop in the nose. I didn’t know how much truth there was in the things he told me, but as he told them, they made good stories.A plan to take revenge on the Reverend succeeds in ruining him, and Douglas begins to repent of his roguishness. And here the novel turns out to be contrary to expectation. If the traditional picaresque is written with the satirical intent of holding up to ridicule an “upright” and hypocritical society, if the rogue’s clash with what is right and legal makes him the hero, the standard-bearer of social freedom in a world of blank servitude, then The Adventures of Douglas Bragg is a picaresque that means to revolve the genre against itself.

Madison Jones has been characterized as “a bedrock Calvinist whose characters remain flawed and whose submission to sin requires punishment.” If that is the case, his Calvinism must be read between the lines of his twelfth novel. But something not unlike a literary Calvinism remains on view. In the end, the good man is not the outlaw, but the flawed creature who, knowing that freedom is not the ultimate truth of human experience, struggles within the iron confines of the law, even if his struggles make him slightly ridiculous, even if his desires lay outside. As Douglas’s mother says in the closing line of the novel, “Let this be a lesson for you.”
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Jones’s previous novels:

The Innocent (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1957).

Forest of the Night (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960).

A Buried Land (New York: Viking, 1963).

An Exile (New York: Viking, 1967).

A Cry of Absence (New York: Crown, 1971).

Passage through Gehenna (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978).

Season of the Strangler (New York: Doubleday, 1982).

Last Things (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).

To the Winds (Atlanta: Longstreet, 1996).

Nashville 1864: The Dying of the Light (Nashville: Sanders, 1997).

Herod’s Wife (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003).